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OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 This appeal arises from a suit against five Federal 
Officials, three of whom were employed by the 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”)1, and two of 
whom were employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and who were assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (“JTTF”).2   They appeal the district court’s denial of 
their Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motions in which they asserted 
that they were entitled to qualified immunity against Nicholas 
George’s claims that they violated his Fourth and First 
                                              
1
 John Does 1 and 2 and Jane Doe 3. 
2
 John Does 4 and 5. 
 
3 
 
Amendment rights during the course of an airport screening at 
the Philadelphia International Airport.
3
  For the reasons that 
follow, we conclude that the federal defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity and will reverse the district court’s denial 
of their motion to dismiss. 
 
I.  FACTS 
  
According to the allegations in his amended complaint,
4
  on 
August 29, 2009, Nicholas George, a 21-year old citizen of 
the United States, was scheduled to fly from Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, to California to begin his senior year at 
Pomona College.  George claims that after he arrived at the 
Philadelphia International Airport, he was detained, 
interrogated, handcuffed, and then jailed, in violation of his 
Fourth and First Amendment rights, because he was carrying 
a deck of Arabic-English flashcards and a book critical of 
American interventionism.   
 
When he arrived at the Airport, George presented his 
boarding pass and showed TSA Officials valid identification.  
He was then asked about the contents of his carry-on bag, and 
he told a TSA screening Official that it contained two stereo 
speakers.  He was asked to remove them so that they could be 
separately screened by x-ray.  After George walked through 
the screening device, a TSA Official told him to enter a glass-
enclosed area for additional screening.  George did so and 
another TSA Official (“John Doe 1”) told him to empty his 
                                              
3
 Pursuant to a stipulated protective order entered in the 
district court, the three TSA employees named as individual 
defendants were named as John Does 1-2 and Jane Doe 3, and 
were identified under seal.  The two individual defendants 
alleged in the complaint to be “detectives of the Philadelphia 
Police Department,” were identified in preliminary discovery 
to be FBI Agents with the JTTF.  Those two individual 
defendants have been designated John Does 4-5 pursuant to 
the stipulated protective order.   
 
4
 In reviewing a denial of qualified immunity at the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage of litigation, we must accept all plaintiff’s 
allegations as true and draw all inferences in his or her favor.  
Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d. 438, 442 (3d Cir. 1991).  
4 
 
pockets.  George complied and handed over a set of 
approximately 80 handwritten Arabic-English flashcards.   
 
George contends that the flash cards included words 
commonly used in contemporary Middle Eastern publications 
and electronic media.  He claims that he had them because he 
was trying to become sufficiently proficient in Arabic to be 
able to read and understand discussions in contemporary 
Middle Eastern media.  The flashcards included every day 
words and phrases such as “day before yesterday,” “fat,” 
“thin,” “really,” “nice,” “sad,” “cheap,” “summer,” “pink,” 
and “friendly.”  However, they also contained such words as: 
“bomb,” “terrorist,” “explosion,” “attack,” “battle,” “kill,” “to 
target,” “to kidnap,” and “to wound.”   
 
George had a double major in Physics and Middle 
Eastern Studies and had traveled to Jordan to study Arabic as 
part of a study abroad program organized by the Council on 
International Educational Exchange.
5
  He acknowledges that 
after completing his program – for which he received course 
credit at Pomona College – he spent approximately five 
weeks traveling in Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan.  He travelled 
there as a tourist and to practice his Arabic.
6
  
 
 After seeing the flashcards, John Doe 1 took George to 
another screening area where Doe 1 and a second TSA 
screener (“John Doe 2”) swabbed George’s cell phone for 
explosives, and searched his carry-on items.  Either John Doe 
1 or John Doe 2 then telephoned a supervisor, Jane Doe 3, 
and she arrived at the screening area within 30 minutes. 
 
 George claims that upon her arrival, Jane Doe 3 
subjected him to aggressive interrogation and detained him 
for an additional 15 minutes.  When asked about his 
flashcards, George explained that he was using them to learn 
Arabic vocabulary.  He submits that the interrogation 
included the following exchange: 
Jane Doe 3:  You know who did 
                                              
5
 The Council is a non-profit U.S. organization founded in 
1947. 
6
 It does not appear that George was questioned about his 
travels by the TSA Officials. 
5 
 
9/11? 
 
George: Osama bin Laden. 
 
Jane Doe 3: Do you know what 
language he spoke? 
 
George: Arabic. 
 
Jane Doe 3: Do you see why 
these cards are suspicious? 
 
 Jane Doe 3 also commented about one of his books 
entitled, “Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the 
Failure of Good Intentions.”  The book was critical of United 
States foreign policy.  However, in responding to Jane Doe 
3’s questioning, George insists that he made no threatening 
statements, and that he neither said nor did anything that 
would lead a reasonable government official to regard him as 
a threat.  
 
 As Jane Doe 3 was in mid-sentence questioning 
George, William Rehiel, a Philadelphia Police Officer, 
arrived at the airport screening area.  Rehiel immediately 
handcuffed George and led him through the Terminal and 
down a set of stairs to the Airport Police Station in the plain 
sight of other passengers. Upon arriving there, he was locked 
in a cell for more than 4 hours.  He remained in handcuffs for 
the first two hours of that detention.  
 
 Philadelphia Police held George for further 
questioning by two FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (“JTTF”) 
Officials, “John Doe 4” and “John Doe 5.”  However, no 
Philadelphia Police officers questioned him or took any 
meaningful steps to investigate whatever suspicions they may 
have had while he was confined.  Furthermore, no one told 
George why he was being held.  Rather, the Philadelphia 
Police called the JTTF Officials for them to evaluate whether 
he was a threat. 
 
 When the JTTF Officials finally arrived, they searched 
his carry-on belongings, and then escorted him out of his cell 
to a room where they interrogated him for 30 minutes.  They 
6 
 
questioned him about his personal and religious beliefs, 
travel, educational background, and political and social 
associations, e.g., whether he was a member of “pro-Islamic” 
or “communist” groups on campus, or whether he met anyone 
during his travels who was overtly against the U.S. 
government.   
 
 After about 30 minutes of questioning, the JTTF 
Officials told George that the Philadelphia Police called them 
to evaluate whether he was a real threat, that they (the JTTF 
Officials) had concluded that he was not a threat, and that he 
was free to leave.  Thus, more than five hours after his ordeal 
began, he was released from custody.  George claims that he 
was not free to leave at any time before the JTTF Officials 
allowed him to go, and he was not advised of his rights, 
allowed to make a phone call or contact an attorney before 
then.  
 
 The following day, George returned to the airport and 
boarded a flight that took him to his destination without 
further incident.   
 
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
 
 George filed a complaint and an amended complaint in 
the district court asserting a Bivens’ action against the three 
TSA Officials and the two JTTF Officials.
7, 8  
The amended 
                                              
7
 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bur. of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), the Supreme Court held 
that federal officers who acted under color of law were liable 
for damages caused by their violations of a plaintiff’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Pursuant to Bivens, “a citizen suffering a 
compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest 
could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the 
district courts to obtain an award of money damages against 
the responsible federal official.”  Butz v. Economou, 488 U.S. 
478, 504 (1978).     
 
8
 George also asserted claims against the United States under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1),  and 
against two Philadelphia Police officers, Rehiel and Edward 
Richards, who George alleges was the duty sergeant for at 
7 
 
complaint alleges that the individual Federal Officials 
subjected him to an unreasonable search and seizure in 
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and that they 
detained him in retaliation for his possession of Arabic-
language flashcards and the content of a book he was 
carrying, in violation of his First Amendment rights.  
 
 As we noted at the outset, the TSA and JTTF Officials 
filed motions to dismiss the Bivens’ claims pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).  They argued that George’s allegations 
did not establish a constitutional violation, and that even if he 
had adequately pled such a violation, they were entitled to 
qualified immunity because the underlying constitutional 
rights were not so clearly established at the time of his 
detention to deprive them of that defense.  
 
 The district court denied the motions to dismiss 
explaining that “the amended complaint alleges claims for 
relief that are ‘plausible on [their] face.’Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (U.S. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).”  The individual 
Federal Officials filed an appeal from the denial of their Rule 
12(b)(6) motions and an unopposed motion for clarification in 
which they asked the district court to confirm its intent to 
reject their assertion of qualified immunity.  
 
 In response, the district court further explained that the 
amended complaint “contains sufficient factual allegations of 
specific conduct on the part of each defendant that, if true, 
constitute violations of plaintiff’s First and Fourth 
Amendment rights.”  The Court further explained:  
The procedures employed by the 
defendants, as alleged here, do not 
appear to have been minimally 
designed to protect plaintiff’s 
personal privacy and individual 
liberty rights.  The TSA’s 
statutory and regulatory authority 
                                                                                                     
least part of the time he was detained by the Philadelphia 
Police, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  However, those claims are 
not before us in this appeal. 
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appears to have been exhausted 
after the first 10-15 minutes, once 
plaintiff was found to possess 
nothing that would endanger 
airline safety. Moreover, an 
investigatory detention and arrest 
are constitutional only if 
supported by reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity or probable 
cause of a specific crime.  Here, 
the amended complaint does not 
provide a reasonable inference of 
individualized suspicion or 
probable cause for the prolonged 
detention and arrest of plaintiff. 
 
If the facts alleged are true, the 
TSA’s seizure of plaintiff 
amounted to an investigatory 
detention, which escalated to an 
arrest when the [Philadelphia 
Police Department] handcuffed 
and locked him in a cell at the 
direction of the TSA and JTTF.  
Accordingly, the amended 
complaint adequately alleges that 
each individual defendant 
participated in subjecting plaintiff 
to an intrusion upon his personal 
freedom for more than five hours.  
There were no grounds for 
reasonable suspicion of any 
criminality or probable cause.  
Early on, it was determined that 
he posed no threat to airline 
safety. 
 
Joint Appendix (JA) 84-85 (citations omitted). 
 
 The court explained its refusal to dismiss George’s 
First Amendment claim as follows: 
The amended complaint also 
plausibly sets forth a First 
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Amendment violation.  Except for 
certain narrow categories, “all 
speech is protected by the First 
Amendment.” The “right to 
receive information and ideas” is 
also well-established. To proceed 
on the retaliation claim, plaintiff 
must plead “(1) that he engaged in 
constitutionally-protected activity; 
(2) that the government responded 
with retaliation; and (3) that the 
protected activity caused the 
retaliation.”  
 
The factual matter contained in 
the amended complaint suggests 
that the entirety of plaintiff’s 
airport experience may fairly be 
attributable to his possession of 
materials protected by the First 
Amendment.  Plaintiff was “jailed 
for several hours . . . solely 
because he passed through an 
airport screening checkpoint with 
a set of Arabic-English flashcards 
and a book critical of American 
foreign policy.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 1.  
TSA screeners inspected the 
flashcards and one screener 
“flipped through the pages of 
books that Mr. George had” and 
the other screener discussed the 
flashcards with their supervisor.  
Id. ¶¶ 27-29.  The TSA supervisor 
questioned plaintiff because the 
flashcards were “suspicious.”  Id. 
¶¶ 37-39.  “After noticing the 
book, the TSA supervisor 
continued her hostile and 
aggressive questioning . . . .”  Id. 
¶¶ 36-37.  The amended 
complaint adequately alleges that 
each defendant violated plaintiff’s 
10 
 
right to read, study and possess 
protected materials by arresting 
and detaining him for his exercise 
of those rights.   
 
JA 86 (certain citations omitted). 
 
 The court also explained that the individual Federal 
Officials’ assertion of qualified immunity, “may be clarified 
by discovery.”  JA 87. 
 The Federal Officials then filed this appeal from the 
district courts’ October 28, 2011, Order.9  
 
III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND STANDARD 
OF REVIEW. 
  
 Before addressing the merits, we must first determine 
whether we have jurisdiction.  See In re Flat Glass Antitrust 
Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 88 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Ford 
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1997) (We “have 
an ‘independent responsibility to examine our own 
jurisdiction sua sponte.’”).10 
  
 The district court denied the individual Federal 
Officials’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, “because the 
amended complaint alleges claims for relief that are 
‘plausible on [their] face.’”  Apparently unsure about whether 
the district court was rejecting the defendant’s assertion of 
qualified immunity, the individual Federal Officials filed an 
unopposed motion for clarification.   
  
 In response to the motion, the district court stated that 
George’s amended complaint “contains sufficient factual 
allegations of specific conduct on the part of each defendant 
that, if true, constitute violations of plaintiff’s First and 
                                              
9
We treated this as an Amended Notice of Appeal. 
 
10
  The Clerk of this Court initially entered an order stating 
that the appeal was not taken from a final order and asking 
the parties to address this Court’s jurisdiction.  Following the 
parties’ response to that Order, the Clerk referred the 
jurisdictional issue to this merits panel.   
11 
 
Fourth Amendment rights.”  The court also concluded that the 
individual federal defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity 
“may be clarified by discovery.” 
  
 After a review of the parties’ initial submissions and 
their briefs, it is clear that we have jurisdiction over this 
appeal. 
  
 “Ordinarily we do not have jurisdiction to review 
district court orders denying motions to dismiss . . . because 
there is no final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.”  Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 605 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citation omitted).  However, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 672-675 (2009), the Supreme Court held that a district 
court order denying a motion to dismiss based on qualified 
immunity is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.   
Here, however, the district court did not specifically 
engage in the traditional qualified immunity analysis before 
denying the individual federal defendants’ motions to 
dismiss.  Rather, as noted, in its order addressing the 
individual federal defendants’ motion for clarification, it 
simply said the “defense of qualified immunity in this case 
may be clarified by discovery.”  However, in that same order 
the district court held that the amended complaint stated a 
valid claim against each federal defendant for violation of the 
First and Fourth Amendments.  Thus, because the district 
court held that the amended complaint sufficiently pled valid 
constitutional claims against the individual federal 
defendants, the practical effect of the district court’s order 
was a denial of the defense of qualified immunity.  
Accordingly, we will regard that order as an appealable 
collateral order.  
Where the district court bases its refusal to grant 
a qualified-immunity motion on the premise 
that the court is unable, . . . or prefers not to, 
determine the motion without discovery. . ., that 
refusal constitutes at least an implicit decision 
that the complaint alleges a constitutional claim 
on which relief can be granted.  That purely 
legal decision does not turn on whether the 
plaintiff can in fact elicit any evidence to 
support his allegations; it thus possesses the 
requisite finality for immediate appealability 
12 
 
under the collateral order doctrine. . . .  A 
district court’s perceived need for discovery 
does not impede immediate appellate review of 
the legal questions of whether there is a 
constitutional right at all and, if so, whether it 
was clearly established at the time of the alleged 
conduct, for until these threshold immunity 
questions are resolved, discovery should not be 
allowed. 
 
X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(citations, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).   
  
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly “stressed the 
importance of resolving [qualified] immunity questions at the 
earliest possible stage of the litigation.”  Hunter v. Bryant, 
502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).  Thus, district courts should move 
“expeditiously to weed out suits . . . without requiring a 
defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in 
expensive and time-consuming preparation to defend the suit 
on the merits.”  Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).  
Qualified immunity is not merely a defense, but also “an 
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 
litigation.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001).  
Accordingly, “any claim of qualified immunity must be 
resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation.”  Miller 
v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2008). 
  
 “We exercise de novo review of a district court’s 
denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds 
as it involves a pure question of law.” James v. City of 
Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation 
omitted).   In reviewing a denial of qualified immunity at the 
12(b)(6) stage of litigation, we must accept plaintiff’s 
allegations as true and draw all inferences in his or her favor.  
Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
IV. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE. 
 
Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
personal liability for civil damages “insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  
13 
 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  The 
doctrine is intended “to mitigate the social costs of exposing 
government officials to personal liability,” Farmer v. 
Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1998), by giving 
officials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
judgments about open legal questions.”  Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 
131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).  Properly applied, it protects 
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 
violate the law.”  Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 
341 (1986).   
 
 Determining whether a right alleged to have been 
violated is so clearly established that any reasonable officer 
would have known of it “must be undertaken in light of the 
specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition.”  Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  In order for the 
official to lose the protections of qualified immunity, 
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 
constitutional question beyond debate.”  Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 
2083. 
 Because a government official may only be held 
personally liable under Bivens “for his or her own 
misconduct,” the plaintiff must allege that “each 
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own 
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). 
 
 Accordingly, in order to overcome the defense of 
qualified immunity here, George must allege facts showing 
that the conduct of each individual federal defendant (1) 
“violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the 
right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged 
conduct.”  Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2080.  However, we need not 
undertake our inquiry in that order.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
 The individual Federal Officials make a number of 
arguments in support of their appeal.  Each is discussed 
separately below.   
 
14 
 
A.  George’s factual allegations do not establish that any 
individual 
Federal Official violated his clearly established rights 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 Before addressing the merits of this argument, it is first 
necessary to consider airport security screenings in context 
with the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on governmental 
searches. The Fourth Amendment provides:  
 
The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
 
 In United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 
2006), we held that a warrantless airport security screening of 
a passenger and his baggage without individualized suspicion 
is tantamount to a permissible administrative search under the 
Fourth Amendment.  There, Hartwell arrived at the 
Philadelphia International Airport intending to catch a flight 
to Phoenix, Arizona.  He placed his carry-on luggage on the 
conveyor belt to be x-rayed, and approached a metal detector.  
His luggage was scanned without incident, but he set off the 
magnetometer when he walked through it.  A TSA Officer 
took Hartwell aside after he passed through the metal detector 
a second time.  The TSA Officer then used a magnetic wand 
to determine why Hartwell had triggered the metal detector.  
The wand revealed a solid object in Hartwell’s pocket and the 
TSA Officer asked to see it.  Ultimately, the TSA Officers 
discovered that the object was crack cocaine, and Hartwell 
was arrested by the police.   
 
15 
 
 In his appeal following a conditional guilty plea,
11
 
Hartwell argued that the drugs should have been suppressed 
because the search violated the Fourth Amendment. We 
disagreed and held that the search “was permissible under the 
administrative search doctrine.”  436 F.3d at 177 (quoting 
United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“Airport screenings of passengers and their baggage 
constitute administrative searches and are subject to the 
limitations of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 
 We began our analysis in Hartwell by observing that 
the Fourth Amendment “limits government action in two 
ways.  First, it requires that searches and seizures be 
reasonable, and, second, it states that when a warrant is 
required – in circumstances that are not explicitly defined by 
the text – it must have certain characteristics.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  We then noted that the Supreme Court has “read 
the Amendment’s twin commands in tandem, holding that 
when people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
persons or effects, all searches and seizures must be 
supported by a warrant, unless they fall into one of the 
exceptions to that requirement.”  Id. (citation omitted). The 
“first step in Fourth Amendment analysis is [identifying] 
whether a search or seizure has taken place.”  Id.   However, 
the government conceded that “an airport pre-boarding 
security screening is a search,” id.  It was therefore not 
disputed that Hartwell had “experienced a single, warrantless 
search, which was initiated without individualized suspicion” 
and “was not conducted pursuant to a warrant.” Id. at 178.  
Thus, in order to survive a Fourth Amendment challenge, “the 
search must [have been] grounded in an exception to the 
warrant requirement.”  Id. 
 In concluding that “Hartwell’s search at the airport 
check-point was justified by the administrative search 
doctrine,” id., we first explained that: 
A search or seizure is ordinarily 
unreasonable in the absence of 
individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.  While suspicion is 
                                              
11
 Hartwell reserved his right to appeal the denial of his 
suppression motion in his plea agreement.   
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not an “irreducible” component of 
reasonableness, the Supreme 
Court has recognized only limited 
circumstances in which the usual 
rule does not apply.  These 
circumstances typically involve 
administrative searches of 
“closely regulated” businesses, 
other so-called “special needs” 
cases, and suspicionless 
“checkpoint” searches. 
 
Id. (citation, brackets, footnotes and certain internal quotation 
marks omitted).
12
  We then noted that: 
Suspicionless checkpoint searches 
are permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment when a court finds a 
favorable balance between “the 
gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree 
to which the seizure advances the 
public interest, and the severity of 
the interference with individual 
liberty.”  Illinois v. Lidster, 540 
U.S. 419, 427 (2004) (quoting 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 
(1979)).   
 
Id. at 178-789 (footnote omitted).   
 
 Turning to the specifics of Hartwell’s search, we held 
that “the airport checkpoint passes the Brown [v. Texas, 
supra] test.”  Id. at 179.  In doing so we noted the following 
considerations.  First, “there can be no doubt that preventing 
terrorist attacks on airplanes is of paramount importance.”  Id.  
(citations omitted). Second, “airport checkpoints also advance 
the public interest” because “absent a search, there is no 
effective means of detecting which airline passengers are 
                                              
12
 In Hartwell, we noted that the Supreme Court has not 
directly addressed the issue of airport administrative searches, 
but that it has discussed them in dicta in two cases.  436 F.3d 
at 178 n.5 (citing cases). 
17 
 
reasonably likely to hijack an airplane.”  Id. at 179-80 
(citations and brackets omitted).  Third, “the procedures 
involved in Hartwell’s search were minimally invasive.”  Id. 
at 180 (footnote omitted).   
They were well-tailored to protect 
personal privacy, escalating in 
invasiveness only after a lower 
level of screening disclosed a 
reason to conduct a more probing 
search.  The search began when 
Hartwell simply passed through a 
magnetometer and had his bag x-
rayed, two screenings that 
involved no physical touching.  
Only after Hartwell set off the 
metal detector was he screened 
with a wand – yet another less 
intrusive substitute for a physical 
pat-down.  And only after the 
wand detected something solid on 
his person, and after repeated 
requests that he produce the item, 
did the TSA agents (according to 
Hartwell) reach into his pocket. 
 
In addition to being tailored to 
protect personal privacy, other 
factors make airport screening 
procedures minimally intrusive in 
comparison to other kinds of 
searches.  Since every passenger 
is subjected to a search, there is 
virtually no stigma attached to 
being subjected to a search at a 
known, designated airport search 
point. Moreover, the possibility 
for abuse is minimized by the 
public nature of the search.  
Unlike searches conducted on 
dark and lonely streets at night 
where often the officer and the 
subject are the only witnesses, 
these searches are made under 
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supervision and not far from the 
scrutiny of the traveling public. 
And the airlines themselves have 
a strong interest in protecting 
passengers from unnecessary 
annoyance and harassment.   
 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  “[T]he 
entire procedure is rendered less offensive – if not less 
intrusive – because air passengers are on notice that they will 
be searched.”  Id.  
Air passengers choose to fly, and 
screening procedures of this kind 
have existed in this country since 
at least 1974.  The events of 
September 11, 2001, have only 
increased their prominence in the 
public’s consciousness.  It is 
inconceivable that Hartwell was 
unaware that he had to be 
searched before he could board a 
plane.  Indeed, he admitted that he 
had previously been searched 
before flying. 
 
Id. at 181 (citations omitted).   
 Based on these considerations, we concluded: 
Hartwell’s search does not offend 
the Fourth Amendment even 
though it was initiated without 
individualized suspicion and was 
conducted without a warrant. It is 
permissible under the 
administrative search doctrine 
because the State has an 
overwhelming interest in 
preserving air travel safety, and 
the procedure is tailored to 
advance that interest while 
proving to be only minimally 
invasive. . . . 
 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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 Because we held that a search pursuant to routine 
airport screening was constitutionally permissible under the 
administrative search doctrine, we found it unnecessary to 
address issues concerning consent-based rationales for airport 
searches.  436 F.3d at 181 n.11.   However, we note that the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, has held that the 
constitutionality of an airport screening search does not 
depend on the passenger’s purported consent.  In United 
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007), the court held: 
The constitutionality of an airport 
screening search, however, does 
not depend on consent, and 
requiring that a potential 
passenger be allowed to revoke 
consent to an ongoing airport 
security search makes little sense 
in a post-9/11 world.  Such a rule 
would afford terrorists multiple 
opportunities to attempt to 
penetrate airport security by 
electing not to fly on the cusp of 
detection until a vulnerable portal 
is found.  This rule would also 
allow terrorists a low-cost method 
of detecting systematic 
vulnerabilities in airport security, 
knowledge that would be 
extremely valuable in planning 
future attacks.  Likewise, given 
that consent is not required, it 
makes little sense to predicate the 
reasonableness of an 
administrative airport screening 
search on an irrevocable implied 
consent theory.  Rather, where an 
airport screening search is 
otherwise reasonable and 
conducted pursuant to statutory 
authority . . . all that is required is 
the passenger’s election to attempt 
entry into the secured area.  Under 
current TSA regulations and 
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procedures, that election occurs 
when a prospective passenger 
walks through the magnetometer 
or places items on the conveyor 
belt of the x-ray machine. 
 
497 F.3d at 961 (citations and footnote omitted).   
 
 With this background as our analytical compass, we 
examine the merits of the individual Federal Officials’ Fourth 
Amendment argument. 
1. George’s factual allegations do not establish a  
Fourth Amendment violation. 
 
 (a).  The TSA Officials – John Does 1-2 and  
Jane Doe 3. 
 
 The TSA Officials – John Does 1 and 2, and Jane Doe 
3 – submit that George’s factual allegations do not establish 
that they violated a Fourth Amendment right.  We agree. 
 
 George alleges that the two TSA screening Officials, 
John Does 1 and 2, inspected his Arabic-English flashcards, 
searched his carry-on bag, swabbed his cell phone for 
explosives, and that one of them contacted their supervisor 
for assistance.  John Does 1 and 2 kept him in the side 
screening area for 30 minutes.  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23, 27-30.  
George was not handcuffed while detained in the screening 
area. Then, the TSA Supervisor, Jane Doe 3, arrived, and was 
informed about the Arabic-English flashcards.  She responded 
by further questioning George for about 15 minutes.  
Amended Compl. ¶¶ 33-40.  During that questioning, while 
Jane Doe 3 was in mid-sentence, a Philadelphia Police 
Officer, William Rehiel, arrived at the scene, handcuffed 
George and took him to the Airport Police Station.  Amended 
Compl. ¶¶ 42-45.   
 
 In his Memorandum in Opposition to the United 
States’ Motion to dismiss,13 George conceded that the search 
                                              
13
 As we have noted, see n.8, supra, George asserted claims 
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.  
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conducted by the two TSA screening Officials who searched 
his person and baggage “began properly” and that they acted 
lawfully in “conduct[ing] a thorough search of his carry-on 
items for weapons and explosives.”  Plaintiff’s Memorandum 
in Opposition to United States’ Motion to Dismiss at 2-3.  
However, in the district court George argued that once this 
search failed to discover any explosives or other hazardous 
weapons, John Does 1 and 2 had to release him and their 
failure to do so, and to instead contact their supervisor (Jane 
Doe 3), violated his Fourth Amendment rights.   
 
 The district court agreed, opining that the TSA 
screeners’ authority to search and question George “appears 
to have been exhausted after the first 10-15 minutes, once 
plaintiff was found to possess nothing that would endanger 
airline safety.” JA 84.   The district court then held: 
 [A]n investigatory detention and arrest are 
constitutional only if supported by reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause 
of a specific crime.  Here, the amended 
complaint does not provide a reasonable 
inference of individualized suspicion or 
probable cause for the prolonged detention and 
arrest of plaintiff.  . . . If the facts alleged are 
true, the TSA’s seizure of plaintiff amounted to 
an investigatory detention and arrest of plaintiff. 
 
 JA 84-85 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and 
Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1995).  We 
disagree.  
 
 In Terry, the Supreme Court announced the general 
standards for a limited search pursuant to a brief investigative 
detention, and in Orsatti, we recited the general standards 
governing an arrest.  Although neither case is definitive in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment parameters within which 
TSA officials can detain, search and question passengers at an 
airport security checkpoint, we did examine those limitations 
in United States v. Hartwell, supra.   
 
                                                                                                     
However, as also noted, those claims are not before us in this 
appeal.   
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 As discussed above, we there held that airport security 
screening of a passenger and his/her baggage without a 
warrant or individualized suspicion is permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment as an administrative search.  In Hartwell, 
we upheld an airport screening search that involved an 
escalating level of scrutiny and intrusion where “a lower level 
of scrutiny disclosed a reason to conduct a more probing 
search.”  436 F.3d at 180.   
 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has also 
upheld an airport security search involving increased levels of 
screening.  In United States v. Aukai, supra, Aukai arrived at 
the Honolulu International Airport to take a flight from 
Honolulu, Hawaii, to Kona, Hawaii. He checked in at the 
ticket counter but did not produce a government-issued ID.  
Accordingly, the ticket agent wrote “No ID” on Aukai’s 
boarding pass.   
 
 Aukai then went to the security checkpoint, where 
signs advised prospective passengers that they and their 
baggage were subject to search.   He entered the security 
checkpoint, placed his shoes and other items into a plastic bin 
and voluntarily walked through the magnetometer.   The 
magnetometer did not signal the presence of metal as he 
walked through it, and nothing in his personal belongings 
triggered an alarm.  After he walked through the 
magnetometer, Aukai presented his boarding pass to a TSA 
officer. 
 
 Pursuant to TSA procedures, a passenger who presents 
a boarding pass with “No ID” written on it is subject to 
secondary screening even though s/he has passed through the 
initial screening without triggering an alarm or otherwise 
raising suspicion.  Pursuant to that policy, a TSA official 
passed a hand-held magnetometer or wand around Aukai’s 
body and an item in his pocket triggered an alarm.  Aukai 
repeatedly refused to produce the item and tried to leave.  
When a TSA supervisor told Aukai to empty his pocket, he 
again refused.  The TSA supervisor then touched the outside 
of Aukai’s pocket and concluded that Aukai had something in 
his pocket.  Aukai eventually removed an object wrapped in 
tissue paper from his pocket and placed it in the tray in front 
of him.  Fearing that the item may be a weapon, the TSA 
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supervisor  summoned a nearby police officer.  The TSA 
supervisor then unwrapped the object and discovered a glass 
pipe used to smoke methamphetamine.  The police officer 
arrested Aukai and, after a search, discovered several bags of 
methamphetamine.  Aukai was eventually taken into federal 
custody and admitted to illegal possession of 
methamphetamine after being advised of his Miranda rights.  
 
 Aukai was indicted for knowingly and intentionally 
possessing, with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of 
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 
841(b)(1)(A)(viii).  He eventually entered a conditional guilty 
plea and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the 
evidence that was seized pursuant to the airport search and his 
subsequent statement. 
 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had 
previously held that airport screening searches are 
constitutionally permissible administrative searches under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959-60 (citing cases).  
It then held, citing to our decision in Hartwell, that the search 
procedures to which Aukai was subjected were 
constitutionally permissible because they were “minimally 
intrusive.”  Id. at 962 (citing Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180).  The 
court of appeals also concluded that the “duration of the 
detention associated with his airport screening” – eighteen 
minutes – was “reasonable.”  Id. at 962-963.  For  all of these 
reasons, the court held that “the airport screening search of 
Aukai was a constitutionally reasonable administrative 
search.”  Id. at 963.   
 
 We believe that the conduct of the TSA Officials here 
was also consistent with Fourth Amendment limitations.  It is 
not disputed that the initial airport screening to which George 
was subjected by the TSA Officials was a constitutionally 
permissible administrative search under the Fourth 
Amendment, even though it was initiated without 
individualized suspicion and was conducted without a 
warrant.  It was not until after the TSA Officials discovered 
that he was carrying some handwritten Arabic-English 
flashcards containing such words as “bomb,” “terrorist,” 
“explosion,” “an attack,” “battle,” “to kill,” “to target,” “to 
kidnap,” and “to wound,”  that George was taken by John 
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Does 1 and 2 to another screening area where he was 
eventually questioned by Jane Doe 3.  However, at that point, 
the Officials had a justifiable suspicion that permitted further 
investigation as long as the brief detention required to 
conduct that investigation was reasonable. See Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21.
14
  
 
 We caution, however, that the detention at the hands of 
these TSA Officials is at the outer boundary of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Once TSA Officials were satisfied that George 
was not armed or carrying explosives, much of the concern 
that justified his detention dissipated. However, it did not 
totally vanish or suggest that further inquiry was not 
warranted. Suspicion remained, and that suspicion was 
objectively reasonable given the realities and perils of air 
passenger safety.  The TSA Officials still were confronted 
with an individual who was carrying Arabic-English 
flashcards bearing such words as: “bomb,” “terrorist,” “to 
kill,” etc.  In a world where air passenger safety must contend 
with such nuanced threats as attempts to convert underwear 
into bombs and shoes into incendiary devices, we think that 
the brief detention that followed the initial administrative 
search of George was reasonable. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is important to note that harboring 
views that appear to be hostile to the United States 
government or its foreign policy is most assuredly not, by 
itself, grounds for detaining someone and investigating them 
pursuant to the administrative search doctrine or an 
investigative seizure under Terry.  However, it is simply not 
reasonable to require TSA Officials to turn a blind eye to 
someone trying to board an airplane carrying Arabic-English 
flashcards with words such as “bomb,” “to kill,” etc.  Rather, 
basic common sense would allow those Officials to take 
reasonable and minimally intrusive steps to inquire into the 
potential passenger’s motivations. 
 
                                              
14
 In Terry, the Court reasoned: “there is no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or 
seizure entails]” (internal quotation marks omitted, brackets 
in original). 
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 Thus, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for John 
Does 1 and 2 to briefly continue George’s seizure to consult 
with a supervisor. As noted above, 15 minutes after the 
supervisor (Jane Doe 3) arrived, and while she was in mid-
sentence of a conversation with George, Officer Rehiel of the 
Philadelphia Police Department arrived, placed George in 
handcuffs and took him away.  At that point, the rather brief 
detention that arose from the initial administrative search 
ended.  As we explain below, despite George’s failed attempt 
at establishing an agency relationship,  none of  the TSA 
Officials played any further role in the protracted seizure that 
followed. 
 
 Thus, the actions of the TSA Officials corresponded to 
the level of concern raised by the flashcards.
15
  As we have 
already observed, an airport security search may become 
more invasive when “a lower level of screening disclose[s] a 
reason to conduct a more probing search.”  Hartwell, 463 
F.3d at 180.   Indeed, we think that these TSA Officials would 
have been derelict in their duties had they simply ignored the 
flashcards.
16
 
                                              
15
 Admittedly, some of the Arabic-English flashcards also 
contained harmless, everyday words.  However, we do not 
think that the presence of the flashcards containing  
innocuous words mitigates the presence of the cards 
containing threatening and violent words.  We appreciate that 
George was studying Arabic and claimed to have these items 
to advance his study of Arabic language, culture stories in 
Arabic media and literature.  The TSA Officials did not have 
to accept that explanation and allow him to board an airplane 
without any further inquiry.  Rather, it was reasonable for 
them to make additional inquiries and to consult with a 
supervisor.  
 
16
 We reiterate however, that this does not mean that John 
Does 1 and 2 could have subjected George to a lengthy 
detention based merely on the suspicions that arose from the 
words on the flashcards.   Nevertheless, we cannot hold that 
continuing to detain George for approximately 30 minutes 
under the circumstances here was so unreasonable that it 
violated the limitations that must surround administrative 
searches. 
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 Moreover, George’s allegation that “he was not free to 
leave and believed that he was not free to leave” the screening 
area during the interrogation, Amended Compl. ¶ 41, does not 
establish that TSA Officials violated the Fourth Amendment.   
Indeed, in Hartwell, we flatly rejected the contention that a 
passenger has a right to leave an airport security checkpoint 
once the TSA officials increase the level of their screening 
scrutiny.  We wrote:  
Hartwell argues that once the 
TSA agents identified the object 
in his pocket and he refused to 
reveal it, he should have had the 
right to leave rather than empty 
his pockets.  We reject this theory.  
. . .  [A] right to leave once 
screening procedures begin would 
constitute a one-way street for the 
benefit of a party planning airport 
mischief, and would encourage 
airline terrorism by providing a 
secure exit where detection was 
threatened. 
 
436 F.3d at 181 n.12 (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Airport screening is obviously informed by unique 
concerns and risks. Accordingly, we are reluctant to attach the 
same weight to the inability to leave that that may have in a 
different context.  
 
 We therefore do not agree with George’s contention 
that once John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 completed their 
administrative search for weapons and explosives (within ten 
to fifteen minutes, Amended Compl. ¶¶ 27-28), without 
finding weapons or explosives, they had reached the 
parameters of a legitimate administrative search.  
 
 Under the circumstances alleged here, the Fourth 
Amendment was not violated by continuing this investigation 
even though John Does 1 and 2 found no weapons or 
explosives on George’s person or luggage.  Items other than 
weapons or explosives can give a TSA Screening Official 
reason to increase the level of scrutiny when circumstances 
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suggest that it is reasonable to conduct a more probing 
investigation.  This does not, of course, give TSA screeners 
license to detain and inquire based on a mere hunch, and we 
certainly do not suggest that TSA screeners have a license to 
detain purportedly suspicious travelers for a protracted 
amount time.  But that is not what happened here.
17
  
 
 Given the circumstances here, it was reasonable for the 
TSA Screening Officials to increase the level of scrutiny by 
briefly detaining George so that he could be further 
questioned in an effort to ascertain whether he posed a risk to 
passengers or airplane security.  After the justifiable 
administrative search conducted by the TSA Officials, 
George was detained by Philadelphia Police who are not part 
of this appeal. 
 
 For all of the above reasons, we find that George has 
failed to allege facts showing that the TSA Screening 
Officials – John Does 1 and 2 and Jane Doe  3 – violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.  We therefore need not proceed to 
the second step of the qualified immunity analysis to 
determine whether that right was clearly established at the 
time of the challenged conduct.   See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 
372, 377 (2007).    
 
 Accordingly, the TSA Screening Officials are entitled 
to qualified immunity on George’s Fourth Amendment claim, 
and we will vacate the district court’s order denying their 
motion to dismiss and remand with directions to grant the 
motion.  
 
(b). FBI Agents assigned to the JTTF – John Does 4 and 5. 
 
The two FBI Agents assigned to the JTTF also argue 
that the factual allegations in the amended complaint do not 
establish that they violated a Fourth Amendment right. We 
agree.  The essence of the allegations regarding the JTTF 
Agents is that they went to the Airport Police Station at the 
request of the Philadelphia Police in order to question 
                                              
17
 We similarly caution against detaining someone solely 
because of their nationality and/or choice of reading material. 
However, we reiterate that that is not what happened here. 
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George,  searched George’s carry-on luggage, and questioned 
him for about thirty minutes before concluding that he was 
not a security threat and allowing him to leave.  Amended 
Compl. ¶¶ 63-73.   The district court did not explain how or 
why these allegations stated a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.    
 
We are unable to find any authority that would  
support a finding that Federal Officials’ response to a call for 
assistance by local police and their subsequent questioning of 
the subject of that call for 30 minutes constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment violation.  Moreover, George has not provided 
us with any authority to support his contention that his 
allegations are sufficient to support a claim of a Fourth 
Amendment violation against the JTTF Officials. 
 
Accordingly, we again need not proceed to the second 
step of the qualified immunity analysis. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 
377.   We hold that the JTTF Agents are entitled to qualified 
immunity and we will therefore vacate the district court’s 
order denying their motion to dismiss and remand with 
directions to grant the motion to dismiss.   
 
As we have noted, George also asserted a First 
Amendment claim against the individual Federal Officials.  
However, before beginning a discussion of that claim, it is 
necessary to discuss the basis for George’s contention that the 
Federal Officials violated the Fourth Amendment by leaving 
him “locked in a jail cell for four hours (much of the time in 
handcuffs) without further investigation,” that they were 
“directly involved in detaining [him] and instructing the local 
police to prolong his seizure,” and that his “seizure escalated 
from an investigatory stop to an arrest when the local police, 
acting on the TSA’s request, handcuffed [him], led him to the 
airport jail, and locked him in a cell.”   George is 
apparently contending that the individual Federal Officials are 
somehow liable for his purportedly unconstitutional arrest and 
prolonged detention by Philadelphia Police Officers.  George 
bases that contention on his assertion that the Federal 
Officials had either legal or functional control over the 
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decisions and actions of the Philadelphia Police Officers.
18
  
The contention is meritless.  
 
The only allegations in George’s amended complaint 
to support this rather attenuated agency theory that the 
Philadelphia Police Officers were under the legal or 
functional control of the TSA Screening Officials are as 
follows: 
 John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 were 
Transportation Security Officers 
of the [TSA] – commonly known 
as “airport screeners” – at the time 
of the events giving rise to this 
action.  Each was responsible for 
detaining Mr. George for 30 
minutes at the screening area, and, 
upon information and belief, they 
summoned the TSA Supervisor 
known here as Jane Doe 3, as well 
as the Philadelphia Police 
Department, for further 
interrogation, detention and arrest 
of Mr. George. . . . Amended 
Compl. ¶ 5 
 
 Jane Doe 3 was an official of the 
[TSA] at the time of the events 
giving rise to this action.  Upon 
information and belief, Jane Doe 
3 held a position that involved 
supervising airport screeners, 
including Defendants John Does 1 
and 2.  Jane Doe interrogated Mr. 
George in a hostile and aggressive 
manner, continued his detention, 
and turned him over to Defendant 
                                              
18
 As noted, see n.8, supra, George also asserted claims 
against the Philadelphia Police Officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  However, those claims are not before us in this 
appeal, and we take no position on the propriety of the 
Philadelphia Police Officers’ conduct in this case. 
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Rehiel to be handcuffed, arrested, 
jailed, and further interrogated. . . 
. Amended Compl. ¶ 6. 
 
 The amended complaint further alleges that while 
George was being questioned by Doe 3, Officer Rehiel, 
arrived on the scene, handcuffed George and took him to the 
Airport Police Station without speaking to any of the Federal 
Officials.  Amended Compl. ¶¶ 42-45.   Finally, the amended 
complaint alleges that George’s “detention, arrest, 
unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, and 
interrogation . . . by the Defendants, as described in [the 
preceding paragraphs], constituted an unreasonable search 
and seizure in violation of clearly established rights under the 
Fourth . . . Amendment[] to the United States Constitution.”  
Amended Compl. ¶ 81. 
 As we have noted, in reviewing a denial of qualified 
immunity pursuant to a denial of a motion under Rule 
12(b)(6), we must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and 
draw all inferences in plaintiff’s favor.  Torisky, 446 F.3d at 
442.  However, “a pleading that offers ‘labels and 
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  
“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 
at 678  (citing Twombly, at 557). “[T]he tenet that a court 
must accept as true all the allegations contained in a 
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  Id.   
  
 George’s allegations are an attempt to construct a 
theory that the Philadelphia Police Officers acted under the 
legal or functional control of the TSA Screening Officials.  
This purported  agency relationship  is based entirely on 
George’s allegations that Does 1 and 2 “summoned . . . the 
Philadelphia Police Department, for [his] further 
interrogation, detention and arrest,”  and that Doe 3 “turned 
him over to [Police Officer Rehiel] to be handcuffed, arrested, 
jailed and further interrogated.”  George attempts to further 
weave a tapestry of inferences culminating in a conclusion of 
agency by contending that an arrest is the inevitable result of 
summoning Police and turning someone over to them.  
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 George cites the majority opinion in Tobey v. Jones, 
706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013), to support that contention.  
There, Tobey was scheduled to fly from Richmond, Virginia 
to Wisconsin to attend his grandfather’s funeral.  He waited 
until there was a short line at the TSA screening checkpoint 
and then presented his boarding pass and ID to the TSA pre-
screening official.  Tobey also placed his belt, shoes, 
sweatshirt and other carry-on items on the conveyor belt.  
However, TSA Official Smith diverted him from the standard 
screening device to the Advanced Imaging Technology 
(“AIT”) scanning unit for enhanced screening. 
 
 Anticipating that he might be subjected to enhanced 
screening, Tobey had written the text of the Fourth 
Amendment on his chest because he believed that AIT 
scanning was unconstitutional.
19
  Before going through the 
AIT unit, Tobey placed his sweatpants and t-shirt on the 
conveyor belt, leaving him dressed only in running shorts and 
socks and revealing the text of the Fourth Amendment written 
on his chest.  Smith, the TSA Official, told Tobey that he did 
not need to remove his clothes.  Tobey responded that he 
wanted to express his belief that the TSA’s advanced 
screening procedures violated the Fourth Amendment.   
 
 Thereupon, Smith radioed for assistance.  Smith’s 
supervisor, Jones, told Smith to order Tobey to remain in 
front of the AIT unit.  Jones and an unknown TSA Official 
then asked the Richmond International Airport (“RIA”) 
Police for assistance.  Tobey never refused to undergo the 
AIT screening and never declined to comply with any TSA 
request. 
 
 RIA Police Officers arrived on the scene and 
immediately handcuffed and arrested Tobey.  None of the 
TSA Officials informed the RIA Police about what had 
occurred at the screening station and the RIA police never 
asked.  A Police Officer escorted Tobey to a side area and 
told him he was under arrest for creating a public disturbance.  
An unknown TSA Official searched Tobey’s belongings and 
                                              
19
 This does not appear to have been particularly thoughtful, 
and it surely was not the least bit effective, but it certainly 
was creative.  
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removed unidentified items.  A Police Officer then collected 
Tobey’s belongings with the assistance of TSA Officials. 
 
 The RIA Police then took Tobey to the RIA Police 
Station where police officers questioned him and threatened 
him with various criminal sanctions.  Tobey was eventually 
charged with the state crime of disorderly conduct in a public 
place. The police officers later released Tobey after 
consulting with an Air Marshal from the Federal Air 
Marshal’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, and he boarded the 
plane without further incident after being held for over an 
hour. The county attorney subsequently dropped state 
criminal charges.   
 
 Tobey filed a Bivens’ action against TSA Officials 
Smith and Jones and a § 1983 action against the RIA Police 
Officers alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, his First and Fourteenth Amendments 
rights, and his right to Equal Protection of the law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Thereafter, Smith and Jones, the 
TSA Officials, moved to dismiss all of the claims, asserting 
qualified immunity.  The district court granted the TSA 
Officials’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment and 
Equal Protection claims.   However, it did not dismiss 
Tobey’s First Amendment retaliation claim against those 
officials.  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
explained the district court’s reasoning as follows:  
The court held that because there 
is a question of whether the TSA 
Agents in fact radioed for 
assistance because of the message 
Plaintiff sought to convey or 
because of some other reasonable 
restriction on First Amendment 
activity in the security area, 
dismissal [of the First 
Amendment claims] on the basis 
of qualified immunity would be 
improper. 
 
706 F.3d at 385 (citation, internal quotation marks and 
brackets omitted).   
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 The TSA Officials argued that Tobey had not alleged a 
facially valid First Amendment claim and that, even if he had, 
he had not alleged a violation of a clearly established 
constitutional right and so they were entitled to qualified 
immunity.   
 
 For our purposes, it is important to note that the 
majority in Tobey concluded that before it could determine if 
Tobey had alleged a plausible First Amendment violation, it 
had to “correct an erroneous conclusion reached by the 
district court.”  706 F.3d at 385.  The majority concluded that 
the district court had erred “in concluding that Mr. Tobey 
failed to plead [that the TSA Officials] in some way caused 
his arrest.”  Id. (citation omitted) (brackets added).  The 
district court had concluded  
that Mr. Tobey’s complaint is 
devoid of any facts suggesting 
that the [TSA Officials] – neither 
of whom are law enforcement 
officers with the power to arrest – 
made any such assertion or 
otherwise indicated to the [RIA] 
police that [Tobey] should be 
arrested. 
 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets 
added).
20
   
 
 Correcting what it believed to have been error, the 
majority stated: “[f]ortunately for Mr. Tobey, he was not 
required to state these precise magical words in order to 
plausibly plead that [the TSA Officials] caused his arrest.”  
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  The majority then 
concluded:   
It is an undoubtedly natural 
consequence of reporting a person 
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 TSA Screening Officials here remind us that they lack the 
authority to make an arrest.  See TSA Management Directive 
1100.88-1(A) at 2. available at 
http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/foia/TSA_MD_1100_88_1_Fin
al_0070511.pdf  (omitting security screening screeners from 
categories of TSA employees authorized to make arrests).   
34 
 
to the police that the person will 
be arrested; especially in the 
scenario we have here, where 
TSA and [RIA] police act in close 
concert. So long as Mr. Tobey’s 
complaint rendered it plausible 
that [the TSA Officials] helped 
effectuate his arrest, the district 
court should have factored the 
arrest into its decision as to 
whether Mr. Tobey alleged 
plausible Bivens claims against 
[the TSA Officials]. 
 
Id. at 386 (brackets added).  Later, the majority opined: “It is 
reasonable to infer that whatever [the TSA Officials] told 
[RIA] police caused Mr. Tobey’s arrest.”  Id. (brackets 
added).   
 
 We disagree with the Tobey majority’s conclusion that 
“[i]t is an undoubtedly natural consequence of reporting a 
person to the police that the person will be arrested.”   That 
conclusion does not appear to have been based on anything in 
the record.  Rather, it seems to arise from the majority’s 
personal assumptions and inferences.  However, absent 
something on the record to the contrary, it seems just as likely 
that police officers who are summoned by TSA Officials 
would use their own independent discretion to determine 
whether there are sufficient grounds to take someone into 
custody.    
 
 Traditionally, law enforcement officers have the 
discretion in deciding whether to make an arrest.  Burella v. 
City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 2007), 
(citing Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 
748, 761 (2005)).  Police officers clearly know that they need 
probable cause to arrest someone and we can assume that 
they know they face personal liability if they arrest someone 
without probable cause.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;  see also, e.g., 
Pritzker v. City of Hudson, 26 F. Supp.2d 433, 443 (N.D. 
N.Y. 1998) (“Police officers are presumed to know the law 
governing their conduct.  Reasonable police officers would 
know that it is a violation of well-settled constitutional rights 
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to arrest or prosecute someone absent probable cause.”) 
(citing Catone v. Spielman, 149 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 
1998)).  
  
 Moreover, there is a distinct and constitutionally 
sacrosanct demarcation between the intrusion that is inherent 
in an investigative detention and the kind of detention that is 
sufficiently intrusive to rise to the level of an arrest.   For 
example, a Terry stop is an intermediate level of intrusion 
allowing police to conduct a limited investigation into the 
possibility of criminal activity based on reasonable suspicion 
“even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.” 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 ((1972). 
Accordingly, without more than appears on this record, we 
reject George’s argument that the Philadelphia Police Officers 
were under either the legal or functional control of the TSA 
Screening Officials.   
  
 Furthermore, George’s allegations that the TSA 
Officials had either legal or functional control of the 
Philadelphia Police Officers cannot survive the pleading 
requirements established by the Court’s decision in Iqbal.   
Iqbal was a Pakistani Muslim who, after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, was arrested in the United States on criminal charges 
and detained by Federal officials.  He claimed that he was 
deprived of a number of constitutional protections while in 
Federal custody and sued a number of Federal officials, 
including the Attorney General and the Director of the FB1.  
The Attorney General and the Director of the FBI were the 
only Federal officials before the Court.    
  
 In his complaint, Iqbal alleged, inter alia, that the 
Attorney General and the Director of the FBI “‘knew of, 
condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject 
[him]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of 
policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or 
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest,’” 
that “Ashcroft was the ‘principal architect’ of this invidious 
policy,” and that the Director of the FBI “was ‘instrumental’ 
in adopting and executing it.”  556 U.S. at 680-81 (record 
citations omitted).  The Attorney General and the Director of 
the FBI moved to dismiss, asserting that they were entitled to 
qualified immunity.  The district court denied the motion and 
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 
  
 After reviewing its prior decision in Twombly, supra, 
and analyzing the pleading standards contained in 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, the Court held that “[t]hese bare assertions . . 
. amount to nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a constitutional discrimination claim” and “[a]s 
such are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”  Id. 
at 681 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
  
 Here, the relevant allegations in George’s amended 
complaint are simply conclusory allegations of a Fourth 
Amendment violation.
 21
  After Iqbal, we can no longer 
assume the truth of those averments in determining whether 
the complaint survives a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.  
  
 Accordingly, we reject George’s contention that the 
TSA Screening Officials are liable for what he alleges was his 
unconstitutional arrest and detention by the Philadelphia 
Police Officers.  That contention, as we have explained, is 
based solely on his conclusory assertions that TSA Officials 
had either the legal or functional control over the decisions 
and actions of the Philadelphia Police Officers.   
  
 We also reject George’s claim that allegations about 
the two JTTF Agents show that they participated in his 
allegedly unlawful seizure, arrest and detention.  Those 
allegations are summarized above.
22
  The JTTF Agents 
simply responded to a call from the Philadelphia Police, 
questioned George for about thirty minutes, determined that 
he posed no security threat, and told him he was free to leave.  
The JTTF Agents were not at all involved in George’s 
allegedly unconstitutional seizure, arrest and detention.  
Indeed, the two JTTF Agents were responsible for George’s 
release from the alleged unconstitutional detention.   Even 
though the JTTF agents were called to investigate a potential 
terrorist, and despite the fact that they knew George had been 
detained for over four hours because of suspicions raised by 
                                              
21
 See p. 29-30, supra. 
22
 See p. 27, supra.  
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his Arabic flash cards, the JTTF agents were able to 
determine that he posed no threat and allowed him to go on 
his way after spending only 30 minutes with him.  
 
B.  George’s factual allegations do not establish that any 
individual Federal official violated his clearly established 
rights under the First Amendment. 
 
 As noted, in his amended complaint, George alleged 
that the Federal Officials searched and questioned him in 
retaliation for his possession of the Arabic-English flashcards 
and a political book critical of American policy in the Middle 
East in violation of his First Amendment Rights.
23
   As also 
noted, the district court, in response to the Federal Officials 
motion for clarification, held that the amended complaint 
plausibly set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim.   
 
 In this portion of their appeal, the Federal Officials 
contend that the allegations in the amended complaint do not 
establish that they retaliated against George for his exercise of 
his First Amendment rights.
24
   
                                              
23
 George’s amended complaint also alleges that the Federal 
Officials arrested and incarcerated him in violation of his 
First Amendment rights.  However, we have already 
determined that the allegations in the amended complaint are 
insufficient to show that the Federal Officials somehow 
participated in, or were somehow responsible for, what 
George alleges was his unlawful seizure, arrest and detention 
by the Philadelphia Police.   
 
24
 We are mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court has 
twice in recent years noted that it has not extended Bivens 
implied causes of action to First Amendment claims. See  
Reichle v. Howards,  ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 n.4 
(2012) (“We have never held that Bivens extends to First 
Amendment claims.”), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
675 (2009) (“Because implied causes of action are disfavored, 
the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability to any 
new context or new category of defendants. . . .  Indeed, we 
have declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding in the 
First Amendment.  Petitioners do not press this argument, 
however, so we assume, without deciding, that respondent’s 
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 In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation 
claim, a plaintiff  “must prove (1) that he engaged in 
constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government 
responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity 
caused the retaliation.”   Eichenlaub v. Township of Indiana, 
                                                                                                     
First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens.”).  
Nonetheless, despite the cautionary notes sounded by the 
Court, it does appear that the Court has held that there is a 
Bivens cause of action for First Amendment retaliation 
claims.  In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), the Court 
wrote: 
 
Official reprisal for protected 
speech offends the Constitution 
because it threatens to inhibit 
exercise of the protected right, 
and the law is settled that as a 
general matter the First 
Amendment prohibits government 
officials from subjecting an 
individual to retaliatory actions. . . 
for speaking out.  Some official 
actions adverse to such a speaker 
might well be unexceptionable if 
taken on other grounds, but when 
nonretaliatory grounds are in fact 
insufficient to provoke the 
adverse consequences, we have 
held that retaliation is subject to 
recovery as the but-for cause of 
official action offending the 
Constitution.  When the vengeful 
officer is federal, he is subject to 
an action for damages under the 
authority of Bivens. 
 
Id. at 256 (citations, internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted).  Thus, we will proceed on the assumption that there 
is a Bivens cause of action for First Amendment retaliation 
claims.   
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385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).  “The 
threshold requirement is that the plaintiff identify the 
protected activity that allegedly spurred the retaliation.” Id.   
 
 It is beyond dispute that the First Amendment protects 
George’s right to possess, read and study the flashcards and 
the book he was carrying.   Indeed, the individual Federal 
Officials
25
 readily concede that an airplane passenger may 
read whatever he or she pleases.  However, the fact that 
George had a First Amendment right to possess, read and 
study the materials he possessed does not end the inquiry.   
 
 The fact that George clearly had a right to have these 
flash cards, does not mean that TSA Officials had to ignore 
their content or refrain from investigating him further because 
of the words they contained.  The totality of circumstances 
here could cause a reasonable person to believe that the items 
George was carrying raised the possibility that he might pose 
a threat to airline security. That suspicion was the reason for 
their increased level of scrutiny during the airport screening.   
 
 The TSA Officials’ suspicion was an obvious 
alternative explanation for their conduct, which negates any 
inference of retaliation.  See American Dental Ass’n v. Cigna 
Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Importantly, 
the Court held in Iqbal, as it had in Twombly, that courts may 
infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious 
alternative explanation[s]’, which suggest lawful conduct 
rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the 
court to infer.”) (citing Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 682).26 
                                              
25
 The “individual Federal Officials” are the three TSA 
Screening Officers and the two FBI Agents assigned to the 
JTTF.  
26
 Although it is too obvious to require citation, we 
nevertheless stress that the First Amendment will not tolerate 
singling someone out for enhanced scrutiny because s/he is 
carrying materials critical of the United States or its foreign 
policy. Indeed, it is fair to say that periodicals as diverse as 
The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post will 
frequently contain articles critical of the United States and/or 
its foreign policy during any given administration and at any 
given moment in time.   However, this incident survives 
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 Moreover, because we have found that the individual 
Federal Officials’ search and questioning of George during 
the screening did not violate George’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, we are hard-pressed to find that it could result in a 
First Amendment retaliation claim on this record.  See 
Hartman v. George, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
27
 
 
 Accordingly, the individual Federal Officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity on George’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Federal 
Officials are entitled to qualified immunity on George’s 
Fourth and First Amendment claims.  Accordingly, we will 
vacate the order of the district court denying their motion to 
dismiss and remand with instructions to grant the motion. 
                                                                                                     
scrutiny under both the First and Fourth Amendment because 
of the flash-cards George was carrying.  As we have 
explained, the Federal Officials acted reasonably in briefly 
detaining George for further investigation because of 
concerns that were raised by those flash-cards. 
 
27
 In Hartman, the Court held that a plaintiff cannot state a 
claim for retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First 
Amendment if the charges were supported by probable cause.  
